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Three recent books on Nepal's development offer 
enlightening if varying interpretations of why poverty 
persists for the vast majority of Nepal's citizens after 
more than forty years of development efforts. Two of 
the books, P.P. Karan and Hiroshi Ishii's Nepal: 
Development and Change in a Landlocked 
Himalayan Kingdom, and Narayan Khadka's 
Foreign Aid, Poverty, and Stagnation in 
Nepal, are empirical studies, overflowing with 
statistics and full of references, while Dar Bahadur 
Bista's book Fatalism and Development is an 
essay which synthesizes his years as a scholar and 
observer of Nepal, but never cites most of its 
bibliographical entries. All three books agree that 
development efforts have failed, and all three blame that 
failure on a combination of Nepal's harsh geography, 
the legacy of pre-1950 exploitation by a small elite, and 
the ineffective operation of the post-1950 government. 
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They differ in the relative emphases they give to these 
interacting forces and in the explanations they provide 
for the poor performance of the modernizing 
governments that have directed Nepal since 1951. 
The most comprehensive of these books is that by 
Karan and Ishii, Nepal: Development and 
Change in a Landlocked Himalayan Kingdom. 
Here we have a broad overview of Nepal's development 
efforts and achievements between 1950 and 1990. The 
book is filled with data in tabular and mapped form and 
has an excellent 65x110 em pullout map of Nepal 
included. Paul Karan has been studying Nepal since the 
1950s when he synthesized the few existing government 
statistics, data he personally collected, and the hand-held 
air photos he had taken to prepare the first overview of 
Nepalese resources for UNDP (Karan, 1960). The 
current book makes excellent use of the tremendous 
increase in information that scholars have gathered since 
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that time, though the authors feel still more data are 
needed. The book is a collaborative effort with 
contributions by Masao Kobayashi, Chakramehr 
Vajracharya, Mohan Shrestha and David Zurick. 
The authors lament Nepal's persistent poverty, 
which they attribute to the country's disadvantaged 
geography, to the legacy of Rana exploitation, and to 
the institutional failings of government administration. 
Nepal's geography and Rana exploitation have created 
extremely difficult problems for His Majesty's 
Government (HMO) to overcome. Yet, in the years 
since 1951 HMO has also failed to rise to the 
challenges. History cannot be changed, so the Rana 
legacy receives the least attention. Nor, of course, can 
geography be changed, yet because it defines the 
possibilities and the limits, the book devotes most of 
its attention to defining Nepal's geographical resources. 
In contrast, since public administration can be changed, 
the authors include throughout the book considerable 
information about the planning process and the 
programs of the various ministries. In the introductory 
and, especially, in the concluding chapters they 
recommend what HMO must do to push Nepal forward 
on the path to development. 
The geographical focus of the book is evident in the 
chapter titles and contents. The first chapter, 
"Introduction to a Landlocked Kingdom," gives a 
statistical synopsis of Nepal's current status as one of 
the "least developed countries," provides an overview of 
Nepal's political-economic history, briefly reviews the 
history of development policy since 1951, and explains 
the implications of being landlocked. Not only is most 
of the country so rugged that little land is cultivable and 
transportation extremely difficult, but the landlocked 
position gives India decisive control over Nepal's 
economy. The lack of industrial natural resources forces 
Nepal to import them from or through India, and this 
adds enough transport costs to make industrial 
competition with India impossible. Further, the ability 
of India to strangle surface imports and exports, 
demonstrated most recently in the 1989 border closings 
(the stress of which Karan and Ishii feel triggered the 
political reforms of 1990), means that Nepal cannot 
adopt any policy which India opposes. 
The second chapter describes the physical 
environment and natural resource base by describing the 
geo-ecological zones, the climate patterns, the water 
resources, and the mineral deposits. It concludes with a 
discussion of natural resource management issues. 
Chapter 3 reviews the information on land use, 
forest cover, and related environmental problems. None 
of the recent land use assessments has provided the level 
of detail needed for comprehensive planning; the 
existing theories of land management are designed for 
developed low land countries. Existing data do show 
that forest area in the uplands has decreased little since 
1950s, but forest density and condition have 
deteriorated. In contrast, Tarai forests have decreased by 
48 
25%. The chapter gives a good summary of forest 
management history and issues, approvingly discusses 
the post-1977 efforts to implement Community 
Forestry and identifies the local and institutional 
impediments to its implementation. The chapter 
concludes with recommendations of how HMO can 
improve forest management: improve general welfare 
and income levels; increase local control over forests so 
"forest users" will benefit from forest improvement; 
introduce rural employment programs through which 
forestry products are produced and marketed; reorient the 
forestry bureaucracy to promote community forestry and 
gain the trust of villagers. 
Chapter 4 evaluates agricultural development. The 
authors first review the various measurements/estimates 
of cultivated land. They then discuss the major crops 
and cropping systems. Agriculture, while the mainstay 
of 80% of the population, has performed poorly, with 
little or no gains in productivity. National increases in 
production have come from converting Tarai forests to 
farms, and this increase has barely kept up with 
population growth. Land distribution statistics show 
that 63% of the households own less than 1 ha and 
these holdings sum to only 10.6% of cultivated land. 
Land reform has failed, with some estimates suggesting 
45% of the people are functionally landless. 
Government programs have done little to re-distribute 
land or promote the investments which raise yields. 
Increased production in the Tarai is also more likely to 
go to India than to the hills. 
Chapter 5, "Human Resources," discusses 
population growth and migration. The authors see rapid 
population growth as a major problem. They relate this 
growth to poor government health care, to inadequate 
extension services for birth control technologies, and to 
the low status of women. The book also gives an 
overview of migration, both temporary wage-labor 
seeking migration and permanent migration within 
Nepal and to other countries. Chapter 6 outlines 
cultural patterns and concludes Nepal is much more like 
a "salad bowl" than a melting pot. 
Chapter 7 is a detailed discussion of settlement types 
and urbanization during the last 40 years. Chapter 8 
describes Nepal's industrialization process historically 
and provides a wealth of information. The ninth chapter 
describes the transportation system and trade; again we 
find a rich historical overview. Chapter 10, "Tourism," 
provides a detailed discussion of tourism development, 
emphasizing the history, economic potential, the social 
and environmental impacts. 
The final chapter, "Development Challenges," 
argues that Nepal must meet three major challenges. 
The first is to implement a development plan which 
improves the welfare of the majority and maintains the 
ecological foundations of the economy and society. 
Planners can accomplish this goal by reforming policies 
based on the following axioms: prices set by the 
government must reflect the real value of resources; 
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regulations governing bureaucrat behavior must be 
enforced~ government workers need to be trained 
adequately and given incentives to follow policy 
decisions; local people have to be given power to 
participate in development planning and to manage the 
resources they use. 
The second challenge is to integrate poverty 
alleviation programs with development strategies. 
People need jobs and the country needs greater 
productivity. Both of these problems can be resolved 
by using development funds to hire people to do 
projects which increase the productivity of the economy 
and maintain environmental integrity. Local people 
must participate in identifying, planning, and evaluating 
these projects; examples include irrigation, 
afforestation, soil conservation, health care. 
Bureaucratic ineptitude and "corruption" can be 
eliminated by reforms, though change will be slow. 
HMG planners must provide a plan which establishes 
Nepalese goals and coordinates the efforts of the many 
bilateral, multilateral and NGOs now operating. 
The third challenge is to integrate population control 
programs into the entire development ~ffort. ~he 
demographic transition has psychological, social, 
economic, technological, and institutional roots. Birth 
control must be easily accessible locally, and must be 
free; low caste groups need educational and employment 
opportunities; women and girls need education; health 
care must be available to reduce infant mortality. 
In short, to explain the failure of the modernizing 
governments of the post-1951 years, Karan and Ishii 
adopt an "institutional" explanation, i.e., the 
institutions of HMG need reform: HMG hasn't yet got 
the planning process functioning properly; there are too 
few government workers and they are inadequately 
trained; bureaucratic regulations are not enforced and 
incentive systems do not reward professional 
competence and hard work; local people don't participate 
enough; etc. All of these observations are true and 
must be addressed to improve Nepal's development 
performance. But why these distortions occur and 
whether there exists an underlying explanation of them 
is not addressed. The approach is to reform the current 
system. Karan and Ishii hint at the profound changes 
which are needed, but hold back from specifying the 
class structure and class interests which underlie the 
behaviors they condemn. This choice may be strategic, 
i.e., they believe that the fundamental changes in power 
which are probably needed to implement their 
recommendations will come slowly through reform. 
The instrumental approach is also practical, since the 
economists of the development establishment (World 
Bank, USAID, Asian Development Bank, etc.) as well 
as the power elite of Nepal are much more likely to 
consider the ideas presented if they promote "reform" 
rather than call for the overthrow of the country's ruling 
class. If implemented, however, the reforms they 
recommend will surely alter power relations in Nepal. 
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The other two books more explicitly identify class 
interest as it developed historically to explain the 
failures of HMG to effect development. Dor Bahadur 
Bista, in Fatalism and Development, sees class 
interest as the ultimate cause of Nepal's inefficient 
government, but his book attacks the cultural values, 
instituted by the ruling class, as the immediate cause. 
In fact he never examines the class base of the culture 
and id~ology he abhors. Bista argues that a small elite 
has used the ideology and cultural values of caste to 
establish and maintain its position, and in the process 
this cultural system and its ideology have corrupted 
ordinary N epalis, even those groups which had 
traditionally practiced "Hinduism without caste" and had 
so~ial attributes which could be conducive to 
development. 
Caste or "Bahunism," he argues, presents karma as 
an explanation of social position, thereby creati~g a 
fatalistic attitude in its adherents so they do not beheve 
they can or should act to alter their material 
circumstances. Furthermore, caste divides people into 
hierarchically organized groups in which those on top 
guide the lower groups as their karmic right; one's 
position in society is "ascribed", not earned by one's 
talent and effort, and this causes power and success to 
become divorced from a work ethic or "achievement 
motivation." The division of society into exclusive 
groups causes people to see the world in terms of their 
own group, their afno manchhe. 
The Ranas, to keep tabs on rival noble families, 
demanded that each family have a prominent member 
appear each day at court. From this practice, the 
institution of chakari developed and spread to all those 
seeking favors from persons in authority. Chaka~i 
demands that individuals who want some favor wa1t 
outside the residence or office of a decision maker for 
days, weeks, or months until the petitioner's behavi~r 
convinces the Big Man that the petitioner is one of h1s 
afno manchhe; the big man then grants the favor, wi~h 
the expectation that the petitioner will now do h1s 
bidding. In the post-1951 era, the favor is often a job 
in HMG's bureaucracy. Opportunity for advancement, 
therefore, becomes tied to finding the "right" big man, 
attending to him until he accepts the person as one of 
his afno manchhe clients, and promoting the 
advancement of his patron. Because the client's success 
now hinges on that of his patron, he devotes himself to 
discovering and alerting his patron to the plots of the 
patron's rivals. These patron-client relations and 
political jockeying become the "work" which all must 
successfully complete, while actually doing one's job in 
the government bureaucracy is unimportant. Hence, 
Bista blames caste with its "fatalism" and chakari 
patronage system for the inefficient administration 
which dooms development. 
In contrast to the caste culture and ideology of the 
ruling elite which blocks development, the "indigenous 
peoples" of Nepal, both the Tibeto Burmese peoples of 
49 
central and eastern Nepal and the descendants of the 
Khas of the far west, have social values which can 
generate and sustain progress: a strong commitment to 
productive labor, high capacity for endurance, efficient 
cooperative organizational institutions, and a propensity 
to adapt to change. Real development in Nepal, 
therefore, can only come by eliminating with 
indigenous values the poison of caste. For Bista caste 
is foreign to Nepal. The Hinduism of the indigenous 
peoples was shamanistic Shiva worship that did not 
include hierarchy and divisions based on purity and 
pollution. He maintains that to this day caste ideology 
should not be identified with real castes because not all 
Bahuns accept it, while other non-Bahuns, who have 
recently joined the elite, embrace and promote it. Bista 
writes that the poison of caste penetrated Nepal 
somewhat during the Malia empire of the Karnali basin 
and in the Lichavi and Mall a periods of Kathmandu, but 
it was the Ranas who spread Bahunism throughout 
Nepal and made it the dominant ideology. In contrast, 
Prithvi Narayan Shah and his forebears ignored caste and 
promoted equality between all groups. 
In the post 1951 period, foreign aid has fit into and 
perpetuated the system. "Fatalism is connected to 
dependency, robbing the people of personal control, of 
the sense of individual competence, and of their 
willingness to assume responsibility, thereby 
diminishing their motivation for personal 
achievement... It substitutes instead the perception that 
power and responsibility are qualities invested only in 
powerful others and ... those powerful others are foreign 
aid donors" (p .146). The dependency inherent in aid 
threatens to create an "ingrained social and 
psychological dependency" in the society, a syndrome of 
being a "poor nation," which is incapable of caring for 
itself. The aid also feeds the rampant corruption of the 
system- itself the legacy of afno manchhe and chakari, 
but because there is so much aid, the corruption has met 
with little opposition. So many added facilities, like 
schools, hospitals, roads, drinking water systems have 
been built that "there is little for common people to 
complain about (p.147)." 
Bista also suggests that the predilection for religious 
speculation and punditry induced by Bahunism has been 
transformed in the development era into planning 
exercises, arguments over development strategies, and 
even radical politics. The continuity lies in the 
precedence that discussion and argument take over 
action. The seminar has become one of the most 
successful modern innovations. "It allows people an 
opportunity to demonstrate their erudition; ... the 
activity is ... essentially a manipulation and play on 
words; real decisions are not made and real actions not 
taken (p.l38)." Even the radical political opposition is 
dominated by punditry, espousing "abstract, utopian 
philosophies, having little contact with the genuine 
needs of the people and their culture (p.155)." 
50 
The book's solution to Nepal's poverty is a 
development strategy which opposes fatalism and 
Nepal's domination by an hierarchic social order. The 
transition to a different ideology need not be traumatic 
"because the form of fatalism associated with the caste 
hierarchy is not Nepali." Rather Nepal can draw on the 
value systems of the traditional ethnic groups, both 
Tibeto-Burman and Khas. There is no evidence that any 
Rajput princes came into the Himalaya (p.37), but only 
Brahman priests, fleeing the bloodthirsty Muslims who 
were "systematically erasing all traces of Hinduism in 
northern India (p.21)." These indigenous, non-caste, pre-
Purana, Shiva-worshipping Hindus reputedly do value 
hard work and have social systems in which cooperation 
is integral. They created the trade items that 
distinguished Nepal as a mercantile nation in the past. 
In addition, the identity of individuals in these groups is 
a collective identity, similar to the collective "self" of 
East Asian nations, which have utilized social 
cooperation as a basis for rapid economic growth. 
Although most of these people are powerless, socially 
oppressed, and disparaged, their values and ideals 
represent a great resource (p.157). Bista declares the age 
of "fatalistic hierarchism" over and insists that Nepal 
must move rapidly to a new age based on cooperation, 
and motivated by hard work and personal achievement. 
How the Nepalese people will accomplish this new 
era, unfortunately, is not addressed. Bista does, 
however, see the continuation of the Shah dynasty as 
essential. The King fulfills the "tendency for paternal 
dependency" that all Nepalese share (p.162). The 
monarchy provides a "beneficent paternal figure which 
is reassuring to the Nepali and becomes the basis of his 
developing sense of national identity (p.162)." The 
King is father and the surrounding ethnic groups are 
members of the national family: 
Bista describes cogently the impact of fatalism and 
hierarchy and the (mal)functioning of the post-1951 
state apparatus, but many parts of his argument are 
weak or troubling. First, some of his historical 
interpretations seem questionable. Chief among these 
is the treatment of the Shah dynasty: Professor Bista 
goes to great lengths to separate the Shahs from the 
imposition of caste values and Bahunism, but common 
sense and recent scholarship suggest that major 
continuities have linked the Shahs and Ranas (Whelpon, 
1992). I would like more evidence that Prithvi Narayan 
didn't promote caste than the observations of a foreign 
visitor (Bista only cites Kirkpatrick, p.46) and the 
king's official pronouncements. On that same page we 
find an obvious, but I think revealing, error: "the 
absence of fatalism and stratified hierarchy in the 
Gandaki region facilitated Gorhka's successful 
reunification of the country (emphasis added)." Bista 
seems to assume that "Nepal" existed before the Shah 
conquest, that there is some essential Nepal independent 
of the state created by Prithvi Narayan. 
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Second, the absence of any realistic suggestions 
about what Nepalese citizens can do to transform the 
malignant social system which besets them is 
disturbing. In some unspecified way they are supposed 
to replace caste values with those of the downtrodden 
and disparaged. I think the reason for this lack is 
connected to the next two: the failure to examine the 
class basis of Nepalese society, and the deification of 
the Shah dynasty. 
The third, and most basic problem in my view is the 
major unresolved issue of the book: Bista never 
examines the relationship between culture/ ideology and 
the class-based power which he admits underlies it. My 
own position is that the way a society produces wealth 
involves a class structure and a "logic" to which culture 
and ideology conform, though not in a simple 
deterministic way. If we have a certain mode of 
production, we can expect a certain general social 
structure. That is may be a debatable assumption, and 
one which Bista would probably reject, though we can 
only guess at his reaction. Early on he complains that 
"a great majority of the critics like to focus on politico-
economic aspects of society" and ignore the role of 
"socio-cultural and religious values (p.8)." His book 
emphasizes culture and ideology, but never returns to 
address its class basis. If the social structure was 
imposed by an elite, how can the society be altered 
without changing the distribution of power? 
My suspicion is that he avoids class because to do 
so he must also examine the royal family. Throughout 
the book, Professor Bista seeks to divorce the Shah 
dynasty from the imposition of caste values, as noted 
above. At the book's end he defends the King as the 
benevolent father figure whose existence holds Nepal 
together. The cynic may claim the book is a chakari 
apology for continued royal domination, but I don't 
think it is so simple. The erroneous claim that Prithvi 
Narayan re-united Nepal invites speculation on Bista's 
motivation: he is a Nepalese nationalist, devoted to his 
country and its welfare. He seems to believe that a 
Nepal exists independent of the monarchy and perhaps 
by the 1990s it could; but, he also seems to believe that 
the presence of the King is a practical necessity for 
maintaining the country's integrity, and so Bista must 
portray the Shahs as opposed to caste hierarchy, and 
today's King as a beneficent father to his ethnic 
children. However, the Shah monarchy and its control 
over the Nepali state were based on expropriating the 
surplus production and surplus labor of peasant farmers, 
as Dr. Mahesh Regmi has shown so clearly (e.g. 1978a; 
1978b). Prithvi Narayan's Nepal was a feudal society, 
an example of the tributary mode of production (Wolfe, 
1983), which of its essence is hierarchical and 
exploitative. The caste justification of that hierarchy is 
derivative, although as Professor Bista so clearly shows, 
it acts to reproduce and intensify the hierarchy. Other 
"tributary" societies also had social hierarchies with 
similar patterns of "corruption," fictional political 
struggles, and patron-client relationships. In the post-
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Rana period, the social structure has persisted, funded by 
foreign aid, as the third book under review (Foreign 
Aid, Poverty, and Stagnation) demonstrates. In 
fact, the success of the pre-1951 elite in adjusting to the 
new world of "development" and in using this new 
source of surplus to maintain control belies Bista's 
central claim that "fatalism" makes the high castes 
unable to act effectively on the material plane. Bista's 
neglect of the economic bases of Nepalese society 
leaves me, at least, unsatisfied and ensures that he can 
suggest no concrete plan to make the changes which he 
so clearly shows Nepal needs. 
The final book, Narayan Khadka's Foreign Aid, 
Po-verty, and Stagnation in Nepal more directly 
examines the society's power and class structure. This 
large book, which is theoretically sophisticated and 
empirically detailed, examines Nepal's economic change 
since 1951 but focuses on how foreign aid funded those 
changes. Khadka blames Nepal's dismal development 
effort precisely on the failure to invest adequately in the 
productive capacity of the country, especially in 
agriculture. The reason for this is that foreign aid has 
allowed the feudal elite to maintain control and to avoid 
the changes needed. Without foreign aid the lack of 
investment and low productivity of the tributary system 
would have self-destructed and forced change. With 
foreign aid, the "corruption," cronyism, and patronage 
of Shah/Rana Nepal continues, thereby postponing the 
needed changes. 
Khadka's first chapter, the "Political Economy of 
Poverty," critically discusses development theory, 
questioning the orthodoxy that simple growth will 
alleviate the poverty of the poor. It then provides a 
statistically detailed description of Nepal's physical 
environment, social resources, and economic and 
political history. Chapter 2, "Foreign Aid and 
Development," considers the theoretical and practical 
goals of foreign aid, especially with regard to Nepal. 
Chapter 3 is a detailed examination of what Khadka 
calls the first phase of development 1951-1962. He 
discusses the types and amounts of aid and the political 
motivations of the major donors: the US, India, China, 
and USSR. 
Chapter 4 provides detailed information on the 
sources and forms of foreign aid and on how they have 
changed through the decades. The amount of aid has 
increased spectacularly from Rs 53 million in 1956-57, 
to Rs 66m in 1961, to Rs 1156m in 1985, to Rs 
5088m in 1988, to an estimated Rs 6600m in 1990. 
Prior to 1975, most aid came as grants and was bilateral 
(93% and 66% respectively in 1975-6), though almost 
all of it was "tied," i.e. had to be spent on products 
made in the donor country. After the mid 1970s, 
however, loans and multilateral donors (61% and 55% 
in 1987 -8) became increasingly dominant. 
Chapter 5 reviews the sectoral allocation of foreign 
aid. From 1951 to 1974-5, about 60% went to 
transport and communications investments. In general, 
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agriculture, the sector which engages 91% of the labor 
force, was neglected, but it has been a high priority 
since 1984. Land reform, which is needed to provide 
families with productive assets, has also failed to a great 
extent. Industrial development remains tiny, 
constituting only 5% of GDP by the late 1980s. 
Chapter 6 reviews the burden of international debt. 
Accumulated debt has become increasingly important 
and totaled 30% of GDP by 1988, making Nepal 
vulnerable to the "structural adjustment" demands of the 
IMF. Per capita debt increased from Rs 4 in 1971 to 
Rs 129 in 1980 and Rs 1122 in 1988. 
Chapter 7, "Foreign Aid, Poverty, and Stagnation," 
evaluates the impact of aid. Chapter 8, "Findings and 
Conclusions," summarizes the book. Overall aid has 
hurt Nepal by allowing the feudal elite, through 
"corruption," which is merely a continuation of the 
accepted functioning of the pre-1951 system, to divert 
the money into their pockets and maintain control. The 
continuation of this old system insures that little 
indigenous surplus or foreign aid is invested in ways 
which increase the productivity of the economy, so 
Nepal's economy has stagnated and its poverty 
intensified. 
The solutions Dr. Khadka suggests will be 
extremely hard to implement, but complement those of 
Karan and Ishii. First, he argues that Nepal must re-
define development to mean the reduction of inequality 
and the material improvement of the masses rather than 
simple growth. Second, HMG must realistically assess 
Nepal's natural, human, technological, and financial 
resources in order to wean itself from dependence on 
external resources. Third, Nepal must identify the 
resource gaps that can only be met through external aid. 
Fourth, the government must assess the socio-economic 
and political costs of terminating aid. Fifth, HMG 
must examine its operation to increase efficiency. 
Sixth, the country must plan for the reduction and end 
of foreign assistance by setting measurable performance 
and temporal goals. Finally, Nepal must broaden the 
political base of the government so that a wide range of 
the people engage in planning, implementing, and 
benefiting from development. 
Hence, Khadka recommends the gradual end to 
foreign aid and the initiation of institutional reforms to 
make investments more effective. Land reform is 
essential but not sufficient: the government must 
promote programs which foster investment in the 
agricultural production system to increase yields. 
Interestingly, he does not blame foreign aid donors; 
instead, while he critiques the motivations of the 
various donor agencies, he still places the responsibility 
for the failures in Nepal's development squarely on the 
shoulders of the Nepalese elite. 
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Taken together, these three books offer a tremendous 
amount of information about Nepal and force the reader 
to examine seriously the historical roots, geographical 
impediments, and social failures which have produced 
the current problems. What is interesting is that none 
blames Nepal's condition on international forces, like 
colonialism, the functioning of the international 
economy, or the political and economic goals of the 
foreign aid donors. They all agree that Nepal's power 
structure, which controls the state apparatus and the 
development process, has failed to utilize effectively the 
resources at their disposal. They differ in their 
explanations of why the government has performed so 
poorly and in the relative importance they give to 
Nepal's geographical constraints. Bista calls for cultural 
change, but gives no concrete plan about how the 
culture can be changed. Karan/Ishii and Khadka call for 
reforms of the existing government apparatus to 
improve the quality and execution of development 
efforts. They also emphasize the need for including 
environmental impact and popular participation as 
integral to development planning. None of the books 
calls for the conscious alteration of Nepal's power 
structure, though the implementation of the 
recommendations of Karan and Ishii and of Khadka 
would inevitably produce such a change, e.g., both 
books call for real land reform. My belief is that each 
needs to examine more explicitly both the power 
structure within Nepal and Nepal's role in the regional 
and international political-economic order before they 
can assess realistically the problems the country faces. 
Without a fundamental shift in power, it seems highly 
unlikely Nepalese society and government will change. 
Without identifying the bases of that power, planning 
for change will be impossible. What if power does 
devolve to the poor majority, as both Karan and Ishii 
and Khadka say it must? Will the aid donors or 
neighboring countries tolerate the people-centered 
policies that such a change implies? These are difficult 
questions which none of these books address. 
Citations 
Regmi, M.C. 1978a. A Study in Nepali 
Economic History (1768-1864). Second Edition. 
New Delhi: Manjushri Publishing House. 
Regmi, M.C. 1978b. Thatched Huts and Stucco 
Palaces. New Delhi: Vikash Publishing House. 
Whelpon, John 1993. Ranas Good, Ranas Bad ... 
Hi mal 6 ( 4): 11-14 . 
Wolf, Eric. 1982. Europe and the People 
Without History. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
John J. Metz 
Northern Kentucky University 
HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XVI (1-2) 1996 
